The definitive presence of a huge Muslim population in Europe will have long-term consequences. There is, nevertheless, some debate about the size of the Muslim population, partly due to imprecise data, partly due to the difficulty of knowing who qualifies as Muslim. Is one defined as a Muslim because of one's choice of religious community, or is one a Muslim by ethnic background? Beyond the demographic aspect, the fact that Islam is taking hold in Europe seems to call into question European identity. What does the rise of Islam in Europe entail in terms of shared culture and values? Should we speak of "Islam in the West" as if Islam were the bridgehead for a different culture, or of "Western Islam" as if a European Islam would necessarily differ from its Middle Eastern or Asian versions?

Keywords: Islam, Islam in Europe, multiculturalism, fundamentalism.

Translated from English by Roy, Olivier (2006) " Islam in the West or Western Islam? The Disconnect of Religion and Culture", The Hedgehog Review (After Secularization) 8(1-2): 127-132.

The paper was first presented at the conference "Religion, Secularism and the End of the West", organized by the Center for Religion and Democracy and the Institute for Higher Cultural Studies, Laxenburg / Vienna, Austria, June 3, 2005.

Olivier Roy is the head of research programs at the National Center for Scientific Research, a lecturer at the Graduate School of Social Sciences and the Paris Institute for Political Studies. Author of several books, including: The Failure of Political Islam (1996), The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (2000), Globalized Islam: The Search for the New Ummah (2004), Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways (2010).

Rua O. Islam in the West or Western Islam? Razvyaz svyazi mezhdu religii i kul'tury [Breaking the connection between religion and Culture]. 2017. N 3. pp. 77-84.

Roy, Olivier (2017) "Islam in the West or Western Islam? The Disconnect of Religion and Culture", Gosudarstuo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 35(3): 77-84.

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The continued presence of a large Muslim population in Europe will certainly have long-term consequences. However, the size of the Muslim population remains debatable. This is partly due to the inaccuracy of the data, and partly due to the difficulties associated with the question of who should be considered a Muslim-only those who have chosen to belong to this religious community, or those who are Muslim because of their ethnic origin? The fact of the spread of Islam in Europe has not only a demographic aspect, but also affects the issue of European identity. It is clear that European public opinion rejects Turkey's candidacy for membership in the European Union precisely because Turkey is a Muslim country. In addition, the murder of Dutch film director and producer Theo Van Gogh may have partly influenced the results of the May 2005 referendum when the Netherlands rejected the European Constitution. What does the spread of Islam in Europe mean in terms of the interpenetration of cultures and values? Should we speak of "Islam in the West" as if Islam were the foothold of some foreign cultural area, or of "Western Islam" as if European Islam was different from its Middle Eastern or Asian variants?

Since the late seventies of the last century, when it became clear that the majority of newly arriving immigrants would remain in Europe, immigration policies in Western European countries have been shaped by two models. The first model is called multiculturalism and dominates in Northern Europe; the second is called assimilation and is supported by a wide range of political forces in France. This latter model, which is generally an exception in multiculturalist Europe, has recently gained popularity in Northern European countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark). Both models assume some kind of foundation in the form of a national and / or Western identity, which, however, can coexist with other cultures. However, in the assimilationist perspective ,the "Western" model is considered universal and capable of integrating peoples of other cultures, provided that they abandon their former identity.

However, by the end of the nineties, the point of view that both models were unsuccessful became widespread. This has led to an unprecedented rapprochement between the two countries.

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different European countries in this matter. Those countries that did not consider themselves immigration societies (Italy and Spain) suddenly realized that they already had a permanent Muslim population there, and the Eastern European countries will soon realize the same. This convergence requires a pan-European approach to what Islam means in Europe. It should be noted that the same question is being asked by some Islamic organizations in Europe (for example, the European Council for Fatwas, based in London).

The multiculturalism model failed not because of " multi -", but rather because of "culturalism". The basic idea was that religion is embedded in a culture (or that any culture is based on religion). Believers form a community with their own customs, social connections, food rules, etc., and religious leaders maintain some form of social control in the community. It is believed that being part of the same faith means sharing a common culture. An example of such self-regulation on the part of community leaders can be found in the history of Holland: when Jews were expelled from Spain and Portugal, they were granted asylum in this country around 1600, but they were asked to take over the management of the community themselves.

The French assimilation model failed because it initially ignored the religious dimension of immigrants ' identity, because it assumed that this dimension would gradually fade away in the process of integration. The basic policy was to integrate Muslims in the same way that Jews were integrated into society on the eve of the French Revolution: to grant them all rights as individual citizens, but no rights as a community ("nation") as a whole. But the rise of various forms of Islamic religious revival among integrated immigrants has forced the Government to recognize the existence, in a sense, of a purely religious community. That is why, in 2002, the state created a religious body, the Conseil franqais du culte musulman, which in itself signifies a break with the Republican secular policy of la occite (secularism).

It is clear that the ways in which various European countries define their relations with immigrants go back a long way.-

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They are deeply involved in their own history and political culture. However, national identities are in crisis on two levels: from the top, because of European integration (which has nothing to do with Islam), and from the bottom, because of the crisis of "social connections" in poor neighborhoods (in France) or in large urban centers (in Holland), and because of the inability of the school system to cope with these areas of social exclusion. In any case, the question of Islam, whether it is true or not, calls into question the national and/or European identity in each of the countries.

In fact, both immigration models failed because they failed to recognize and take into account the crucial factor of religious revival in its current form: namely, the breaking of the link between religion and culture. The religious fundamentalism of Muslims in the West is not the result of the importation of a given culture, but the result of the deculturation of Islam. "Pure" cultures, like Islam itself, are in a state of crisis, and immigration is changing the relationship between migrants and their original culture. Second and third generations of migrants tend to prefer the language of their host country to the language of their former homeland; they tend to know French better than Arabic (if at all), English better than Urdu, and even - although this process is much slower - German better than Turkish. Young people tend to adopt the Western urban youth subculture - in terms of dress styles, slang, music, etc. Fast food is more popular than traditional cuisine. Moreover, religious fundamentalism itself is an instrument of deculturation. Saudi Wahhabis deny anything close to "traditional" culture; they ban music, dance, literature, and non-religious poetry. The Taliban in Afghanistan are not fighting Western influence, but traditional Afghan culture, banning music, flying kites, songbirds, etc. This cultural denial appeals to young people, who often feel culturally alienated, even if they are well integrated socially. Van Gogh's killer in Holland spoke Dutch better than Arabic, and his action was not a reaction to the Middle East conflict or Muslim culture. He felt insulted by what he saw as an insult to Islam in a purely Western context.

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Thus, modern fundamentalism implies the separation of religious markers from cultural content. For example, halal refers not only to traditional cuisine, but also to any other. Hence the prosperity of halal fast food restaurants among Muslim converts in the West, but a small number of Moroccan or Turkish traditional restaurants. This break in the connection means that it is not a matter of a clash of Western and Eastern cultures, but of a transformation of faith - turning it into what is seen as a "pure" religion based on isolated religious markers. The problem for European societies, then, is how exactly to address the rise of such a "pure" religious identity - even though secularization is considered a precondition for democracy and modernity.

It is often suggested that the Westernization of Islam means its reformation. A superficial understanding of Max Weber's thesis, which is often misread, leads to the conclusion that the modernity of a religion depends on the content of its theological dogma. Since the dogma of Islam is not supposed to distinguish between religion and politics, Islam is considered incompatible with secularization and democracy until it undergoes a profound theological reform. Such arguments ignore the fact that Catholicism has never undergone a profound theological reform (because it would have meant the triumph of Protestantism), but it has been able, albeit reluctantly, to adapt to modernity. Of course, there are "liberal" Muslim theologians who advocate something akin to the Reformation. But, in my opinion, this is not a prerequisite for Westernization. In fact, Westernization is already taking place, particularly in the most fundamentalist forms of religion, and there are two reasons for this. First, fundamentalism implies a clear separation of religion and culture. Second, the new forms of religiosity are "transversal", i.e., they cross confessional boundaries and are therefore common to Islam and Christianity. What matters here is not religion itself (as a set of dogmas and rituals), but religiosity (the relationship between a believer and religion). Dogmas may vary, but we find common forms of religiosity that explain the religious nomadism of our time - the fact that people are moving out of the od-

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one religion to another, while claiming that they are in search of the same thing.

Current forms of religiosity are based on these patterns. The emphasis on the individual is combined with the crisis of religious institutions. Direct access to "truth" is promised through faith-to the detriment of religious education. The neglect of history, tradition, philosophy, and literature is becoming more and more pronounced, while the direct, personal, and emotional form of religious feeling is coming to the fore. And a religious community is defined not as an already existing "body" (church or ummah), but as a newly created community of "chosen ones" who have made individual choices. The "community" lives within the society and at the same time separately from it.

The space of the Ummah is no longer a territorial space that implies political leadership within the borders of the national State. In fact, most neo-fundamentalist movements, including the most radical ones, have stopped discussing dar ul islam in territorial terms. In their view, the Ummah is everywhere where Muslims can be found. An interesting case is Hizb-ut-Tahrir.1-a radical movement based in London. It seeks the restoration of the Islamic caliphate, but omits the question of its territorial connection: the caliphate can be restored in a very short time, if every Muslim decides that it exists and swears allegiance to it. Thus, a person can simultaneously live as a member of a certain minority group and as a member of a global community.

This dialectic of universality / minoritarianism is interesting because it is found in both Islam and Christianity. Although the vast majority of Americans declare themselves to be practicing Christians, each church describes itself as a minority living in a society in decline (as illustrated by the novel "Abandoned"2, where the "saved" are a minority). Even the Catholic Church recognizes itself as a minority in Europe and calls for unity in difficult times. To the extent that religion seeks to free itself from culture, churches and communities seek to free themselves from it.-

1. Prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation.

2. LaHaye, T., Jenkins, J.B. (1995) Left Behind: A Novel of the Earth's Last Days. Carol Stream: Tyndale.

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These processes are clearly taking place in Spain and Italy, where until recently Catholicism was considered the core of the national culture.

The new dilemma for many believers is not how to rebuild society on Christian or Islamic principles, but how to live in this society, following their own religious beliefs. In this sense, "integralism "is increasingly replacing" fundamentalism", and the religious revival does not challenge the existing political or social order. Fundamentalism, which is gaining strength among many second-generation Muslim immigrants in the West, is a paradoxical consequence of their own Westernization, which means, first, deculturation and, secondly, the transformation of Islam into "just" religion. However, the same phenomena of deculturation and transformation can take different forms - "liberal", "mystical" or "conservative-ethical" Islam.

"Liberal Islam" implies that the religious meaning of the Qur'an and Sunnah is released from its historical and socio-cultural context. Historically, one might say that Islam meant progress in the status of women compared to the previous period (jahiliyya, "the age of ignorance"), but that Islam nevertheless had to take into account the customs of the time (for example, it allowed polygamy, although it did not recommend it). To return to the true spirit of the sacred text, men and women should be considered equal. The same argument applies to the prohibition of alcohol consumption: alcohol was banned because people did not know how to drink moderately and were intoxicated by the time of prayer. But if a person drinks without getting drunk, then alcohol is allowed. Regardless of the religious validity of such interpretations, they are clearly aimed at making Islam more compatible with Western culture. However, it should be noted that such views are by definition not dominant among believers and are rather the "soft" discourse of secular or rarely practicing Muslims, when they are asked to explain their behavior.

"Mystical Islam" is associated with the rise of Sufi orders. These fraternities, whether traditional or newly established, are wide open to converts and again blur the dividing line between West and East. Islamic Sufism

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It can be compared with the spread of New Age religious communities and cults in the West.

"Conservative ethical Islam" is perhaps the dominant trend among practicing Muslims, which can be compared to Orthodox Jews. It follows basic norms, especially food rules: for example, the requirement to eat halal food and fast during Ramadan 3. But beyond this normative dimension, rules tend to transform themselves into values on the model of conservative Christianity. Take the example of Holland. When Pim Fortune entered politics, he opposed statements by a Dutch-speaking Moroccan imam who called homosexuals "sick people" and denied their rights as a minority. Fortune, however, did not speak from the standpoint of traditional Western values, but in defense of the "sexual liberation" movement of the sixties, which was seen by many conservative Christians as the decline of a society based on traditional values and principles. Curiously, many Muslims in the West transform their religious norms in terms of compatibility with Western values, but not necessarily in a liberal perspective. For example, they tend to support an anti-abortion campaign, even though abortion has never been a central issue in Muslim countries (it is usually frowned upon, but abortion bans have never been introduced).

The discussion in the West is not between Islamic and Western values, but within the West itself, about what the Western values themselves are. Where is the dividing line between human freedom and nature (or God)? In fact, Islam serves as a mirror in which Europe sees its own identity; but it does not offer a new culture or new values. It expresses itself within the current debate around religious revival and secularism-but as part of the debate, not as the cause of it.

3. Fasting during Ramadan is, according to surveys, the most respected religious norm among French Muslims, outpacing even daily prayer.

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