The article examines the formation of the Iranian model of political structure in line with the process of alternative modernization. The main focus is on analyzing the changes that have taken place in the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the last decade, and assessing the possibility of its liberalization.

Key words: Islamic Republic of Iran, non-Western development path, political system, velayate Faqih, reformers, conservatives, H. Rouhani.

POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND THE CHALLENGES OF LIBERAL MODERNIZATION

Elena DUNAEVA

This paper focuses on the transformation of political structure in Iran within the framework of a non-Western route to modernity. The author explores the correlation between secular and religious components and assesses the possibility of socio-political liberalization in the IRI.

Keywords: Islamic Republic of Iran, political structure, conservatives, reformists, moderates, H. Rouhani, liberalization.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran ended the existence of one of the oldest monarchies in the Middle East and created a new model of political system that over the years has demonstrated stability and the ability to respond to both internal and external challenges. The Iranian model, which is characterized by a combination of theocratic and republican principles in the system of state-political structure, can be considered as a confirmation of the possibility of effective functioning of a modern state that develops on the basis of its own political tradition, i.e., has chosen a non-Western path of development. During the 36-year existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), its political system has undergone certain transformations. The trend towards liberalizing the political system suggests that modernization has an exogenous-endogenous character.

In Russian and Western Iranian studies, much attention was paid to the analysis of the system of state structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the first post-revolutionary decade (Iranskaya Revolyutsiya, 1989). Attempts at political reform were considered in detail.-

DUNAEVA Elena Viktorovna-Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. elena-vd@list.ru.

Elena DUNAEVA - PhD (in History), Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, elena-vd@list.ru.

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during the presidency of M. Khatami (1997-2005) [Mammadova, 2001 (1); Mammadova, 2001 (2); Mammadova, 2005; Filin, 2012; Ansari, 2006; Tazmini, 2012]. However, the processes that took place in the country's political arena after the new president, a protege of the conservative forces, M. Ahmadinejad, came to power (2005-2013), and led to a deep internal political crisis, the consequences of which the moderate forces bloc, which was in power in 2013, is trying to eliminate, have not yet received proper coverage. This article is intended to fill this gap.

Iran is a theocratic state in which the spiritual authority determines all actions and thoughts, and the clergy controls all branches of government. Nevertheless, the state system presupposes the existence of republican institutions formed on an electoral basis. Referring to the democratic messages in Islam, relying on the kinship of many Islamic precepts with democratic ideas, and comparing different forms of the modern Islamic state, Iranian political scientists and legal scholars argue that the system of power created in the country is a "religious democracy" (Manuchihri, 2007, pp. 27-79). It is legitimate, however, to describe the political system of Iran as authoritarian.

The period from 1979 to the beginning of the 1990s was marked by the strengthening of the position of the clergy in the structures of power, the ousting of left-wing national liberal forces from the political scene, and the strengthening of the velayate-faqih system-the granting of state powers to the most authoritative theologian who led the Muslim community. The Shiite clergy, based on the idea of an indissoluble link between religion and politics, not only headed theocratic power structures, but also sought to take control of the elected bodies, especially the parliament, trying to adapt the practice of modern political systems to their goals. In 1979, the Party of the Islamic Republic (PIR) was established, whose task was to ensure the political leadership of the clergy in the elected authorities. Two other political organizations - the Society of Struggling Clergy and the Society of Teachers of the Kuma Theological Center-also actively participated in political life, in particular, they controlled the activities of Islamic trade unions and cultural organizations. By the mid-1980s, religion had become a system-forming element of the country's politics.

The Iranian researcher M. Mohammadi compares the project of "religious democracy" being implemented in Iran with the model of a constitutional monarchy, in which the absolute ruler actually controls the activities of elected institutions. According to Mohammadi, this model is consistent with the interests of the country's main political forces (Mohammadi, 2014).

In the twentieth century, three attempts were made in Iran to weaken "absolute" power and strengthen republican tendencies, but they failed. At the beginning of the last century, constitutional reforms led to the establishment of the despotic regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi (1925-1941). The struggle for democratization and nationalization of oil in the early 1950s ended with the strengthening of the power of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979). The anti-Shah revolution of 1979 resulted in the establishment of the "absolute rule of Wali Faqih". The struggle between two opposing tendencies (Mohammadi calls them strategic projects of absolutism and constitutionality) for the consolidation of absolutist power and for the development of republican foundations was observed in the country throughout the XX century. [ibid.].

In the mid-1980s, the clergy became increasingly divided on the further development of the country. As a result, there was a split into "right" and"left" 1,

1 The concepts of "left" and" right " can be used to characterize political groups in the Islamic Republic of Iran rather conditionally, since they do not fully correspond to the meanings used in modern political science.

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and the FEAST was dissolved. The opposing factions had their own vision of Iran's domestic and foreign policy. The "rightists" defended the idea of preserving the velayat-faqih regime in the form in which it was enshrined in the Constitution, while simultaneously advocating economic freedom and the formation of a market economy. The" leftists", while supporting the velayat-faqih doctrine, pointed out the need to develop Islamic democracy and republican institutions, establish justice, condemn property inequality, remain supporters of state or cooperative ownership and expand social support for the poor.

The political rivalry between the" left "and" right", which began during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), continued in the 1990s and determined the nature of political processes in Iran. The presence of" leftists "and" rightists " in the central government helped maintain a certain balance of power in the political arena. The unwavering authority of the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, kept the contradictions from escalating into conflicts, but the activities of the Government and the Majlis were hindered, which affected political decision-making.

The current domestic political situation in the country required an adjustment of the Constitution and some changes in the management system. In 1989, after a nationwide referendum, amendments to the Basic Law came into force, according to which the rights of the spiritual leader were expanded; the post of Prime Minister was abolished, which meant strengthening the role of the president; a new body of state power was formed-the Council for Determining the expediency of decisions made, whose members were appointed by the spiritual leader. The Council performed advisory functions and acted as an arbitrator if the Supervisory Board and the Mejlis did not come to an agreement. In general, the amendments to the Constitution contributed to the further centralization of power in the country.

The first decade after the Islamic Revolution can be described as a period of differentiation of governance institutions and their functions in order to increase efficiency. Iranian sociologist Kh. Bashariye calls these years "a period of strengthening the oligarchy of the clergy" [Bashariye, 2002/2003, p. 51].

The completion of the first ethan of political system reform coincided with the death of Imam Khomeini and the election of a new Wali Faqih, as well as the beginning of economic liberalization under President-elect Hashemi-Rafsanjani (1989-1997). He initiated a discussion of projects that, if implemented, could lead to some political liberalization. So, Rafsanjani came up with the idea of creating a council of outstanding theologians, which was supposed to develop a development strategy and monitor the activities of the authorities [Rakh bara-ye shaw-rai kardan-ye rahbari baz ast]. It should be noted that the possibility of establishing a faqih council was provided for (but not implemented) by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran before it was amended [Ganun-e asasi-ye..., 1989/1990, p. 91].

During his presidency, Rafsanjani made an attempt to strengthen the presidential power, as numerous structures, interfering in the activities of the executive bodies, hindered the implementation of various programs. His supporters in the Mejlis proposed to abolish the constitutional (two-term) restrictions on holding the post of president. However, attempts to formally strengthen the position of the head of state were not crowned with success.

Western researchers call the years of Rafsanjani's rule the Second or commercial-bourgeois Republic [Ansari, 2006, p. 52-64], thus emphasizing the departure from the revolutionary line of the first decade, which was expressed in reliance on the commercial bourgeoisie. Rafsanjani's pragmatic liberal course, adapted by him in the economic and foreign policy spheres, led to the beginning of socio-political liberalization based on the ideas of Islamic modernism. Ideas of Khojat-ol eslam Kadivar, Ayatollahs Shabestari, Montazeri, Shirazi and secular

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ideologue A. Sorush, who devoted many works to the problems of developing democracy in Islamic society [Fedoseenkova, 2011], corresponded to the mood of the new urban strata. In addition, the activity of political organizations has intensified, and the formation of the party system has begun.

The law regulating the activities of political parties was adopted in 1981, but before the collapse of the PIR, the activities of other parties were officially banned. A special feature of the new stage of party building was the formation of parties around two main political associations of clergy - the conservative Society of struggling Clergy and the "left" Assembly of struggling Clergy. Under the auspices of the first organization, the Front of Supporters of the Imam's Line was formed, which included 17 small parties and organizations of a conservative nature. The clergy continued to be the guiding force of all political processes, but some Iranian researchers call the 1990s a period of transition from authoritarianism to "decorative democracy", since" the desire to free oneself from the ideological dictates of the ruling circles " appeared in society [Bashariye, 2002/2003, p.55].

We can agree with H. Bashariye's statement about the emergence of democratic sentiments in Iranian society and the desire of some politicians to create a republican image of the Islamic regime. However, even when using the term "decorative democracy", one should not forget that initiatives to promote greater transparency in political life and economic liberalization came from religious figures with powerful powers, and that the decision to form a new party was made only with the consent of the Wali Faqih, and candidates for elections at all levels were nominated by religious communities.

At the same time, even during the Islamic Revolution, some representatives of the highest Shiite clergy, who shared the ideas of Islamic modernism, advocated limiting the religious component in political life, but maintaining the Islamic regime.

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a noticeable increase in the political activity of the population, and secular political organizations have begun to appear. In the winter of 1996, during the elections to the Mejlis of the 5th convocation, pragmatic leaders of executive bodies - senior and middle-level politicians who shared the ideas of President Rafsanjani, created a new public organization (which later became the Kargozaran party - "Creators"), which declared an independent political line and won more than a third of the seats in parliament. The party's activities contributed to the growth of liberal sentiments, the activation of social movements and the expansion of civil participation in politics. During the 1998 presidential elections, Kargozaran, which joined forces with left-wing organizations and put forward the slogan "For Reforms", managed to cause an unprecedented increase in political activity of the population. The social movement of reform supporters, later called the "May 23 Movement", which was supported by the middle urban strata, brought to power a candidate from reform circles - M. Khatami (1997-2005), and again the processes of political modernization were led by a representative of the clergy.

The new president called for strengthening republican principles and democratizing political life, but all his political appeals were wrapped in an Islamic shell. This fact, in particular, draws the attention of Ali Ansari, who analyzes in detail the idea of M. Khatami about the formation of an" Islamic civil society "and skeptically assesses its attempts to implement" democratization from above " in the absence of a prepared social base [Ansari, 2006, p.144-145, 271-273].

The May 23 Movement, which united 18 parties and organizations, including the Association of Struggling Clergy, which supported the President's ideas, called for the North Kazakhstan Region-

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promote the implementation of reforms in the socio-political and cultural spheres. Women's, youth, and professional organizations, as well as defenders of the rights of national and religious minorities, have become more active. For the first time in the history of Iran, elections to local Islamic councils were held. Under pressure from the Movement, the president initiated reforms that could strengthen the republican authorities. In the autumn of 2002, the reformist-controlled Mejlis approved a bill that significantly expanded the President's powers: now he was given the right to control the implementation of constitutional norms by vetoing decisions that contradict the provisions of the Basic Law.

However, these innovations caused dissatisfaction of conservatives and Rahbar , the spiritual leader of the state. For example, in August 2000, Ali Khamenei (Iran's supreme leader since 1989) blocked a draft law on freedom of the media, claiming that enemies of Islam might be able to promote their ideas in the press. Thus, the state system was once again" protected "from the"challenges of liberalization".

Meanwhile, other progressive ideas developed significantly during Khatami's presidency. However, the public's desire to democratize political life prompted those forces that defended traditional values and opposed modernization to speak out in the 2005 presidential election in support of a neoconservative candidate who expressed the interests of Islamic radicals. The unity of the conservative camp against the background of a split in the ranks of reformers and the disillusionment of the electorate ensured the victory of M. Ahmadinejad in the elections. As a result, for the first time in the entire history of Iran, power was completely concentrated in the hands of politicians who sought to expel pro-reform forces from the political scene and curb democratic tendencies. It seemed that the current situation should have led to the strengthening of the regime and the consolidation of right-wing forces. In fact, contrary to all logic, the concentration of power in the hands of conservatives led to splits in their camp and the separation of pragmatic politicians from it.

On the one hand, 2005-2012 can be considered as a period characterized by a setback from the positions won by the reformers. Ahmadinejad relied on the traditional strata-the peasantry, the clergy, who became the striking force of the Basij movement, which advocated the preservation and strengthening of Islamic norms of public life. On the other hand, these years have seen new trends associated with the entry of secular elites into the political arena, who are ready to push out the clergy and strengthen the secular component in state structures. The reformers, who were completely ousted from all government bodies, made an attempt to restore their positions in the 2009 presidential elections. Some of the clergy, who were critical of Ahmadinejad, supported the reformist candidates.

The election campaign, which was characterized by an unprecedented increase in the activity of the population, led to a split in Iranian society into two parts - supporters and opponents of M. Ahmadinejad. The latter were joined by conservatives, moderates and pragmatists. The country has not faced such a confrontation of political forces for more than 20 years. To curb the opposition, which did not accept the results of the elections, the authorities resorted to violence, including through the militants of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Basij movement has become much more active, reformist parties have been banned, their press offices have been closed, activists have been jailed or expelled from the country, and dozens of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been disbanded.

The consequences of the political crisis that broke out in Iran at the end of 2009 have not yet been eliminated and continue to have a great impact on political life. Contradictions between individual political factions have become more acute, and slogans directed against the main political parties have been put forward during protest actions.

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principles of state-building. Calls for the elimination of velayat faqihs caused discontent among the population, which resulted in mass demonstrations in support of the spiritual leader. These events have shown that many Iranians do not seek change and are only in favor of partial reform of the political system, and that only representatives of students and intellectuals consciously demand reforms. However, their actions can only be successful if they are supported by a significant part of the population.

M. Ahmadinejad, who strengthened his position as a result of the elections and sought to concentrate as much power as possible in his hands, entered into a confrontation with the Mejlis and tried to free himself from the control of the country's spiritual leader. The actions of the chief executive, which can be seen as an attempt to form a new political elite, increase the role of the IRGC and correct the Islamic image of Iran, caused opposition from most conservatives. Spiritual leader A. Khamenei, concerned about the weakening of the government's position, the growing fragmentation of the conservative camp, and possibly fearing the growing influence of the president, announced in the fall of 2011 that he intended to make adjustments to the country's political system in the future in order to legally consolidate the control of the Mejlis over the president, giving lawmakers the right to elect the chief executive to the parliamentary [www.tabnak.ir]. Representatives of various political and religious organizations reacted differently to the proposal of the leader. Opinions were expressed for and against reforms in this area [www.etedaal.ir., www.asriran.com]. At the same time, the issue of possible amendments to the Constitution, restoration of the post of Prime Minister (which will also lead to a weakening of presidential power), and reforms of the judicial system was raised. Liberal forces strongly opposed the reduction of the powers of the head of the executive branch, seeing this as a weakening of the democratic component of the political system.

However, the increased international pressure over Iran's nuclear program, the tightening of sanctions, the worsening economic situation and the discord on the domestic political scene pushed the discussion of these issues into the background and made the task of breaking out of isolation and lifting sanctions more urgent. Foreign policy goals have come to the fore. Nevertheless, the very fact that the spiritual leader brought up the issue of making changes to the political structure for discussion indicates that the religious and political leadership is aware of the need to reform the political sphere in order to preserve the stability of the regime and seeks to take control of the process of political transformation. The question is, which way will the reforms go?: in the direction of strengthening the religious component and limiting democratic principles, or liberalizing and expanding civil society institutions.

The 2013 presidential election showed that more than half of the country's population supported Khojat-ol-Islam X. Rouhani, who has advocated liberalizing foreign and domestic policies, in particular, respecting civil rights, activating the activities of public organizations, equal rights and opportunities for women, ethnic and religious minorities, and is ready to put a barrier to radicalism.

If the competition in almost all previous presidential campaigns took place along the "conservatives-liberals" axis, i.e. the elections were bipolar, then in 2013 none of the camps was able to demonstrate unity, since fragmentation processes intensified in each of them. The struggle of elites within each political camp manifested itself in a large number of candidates. Thus, the participation of five representatives of the conservative camp in the elections turned them into an arena of competition between conservatives and demonstrated the fragmentation of the main political trend. Some conservatives and reformers have preferred

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to dissociate themselves from the main forces and run as independent candidates, among them was X. Rouhani. The conservatives ' attempts to rely on organizations that were active in the first post-revolutionary decades and restore the role of clergy parties in society ended in failure. The passivity of these structures during the election campaign indicates a decrease in the influence of religious institutions. It is obvious that political processes are increasingly influenced by new forces that require the departure of old politicians and the renewal of traditional political institutions.

In general, the contest of candidates in the absence of a clear rivalry between the two political trends reflected contradictions in the views of various forces and trends on how the country would develop further: by strengthening the Islamic component and returning to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, or by strengthening liberal-democratic tendencies within the Islamic republic.

Victory of X. Rouhani confronted the Iranian political establishment with the formation of a new, centrist political direction, which could be represented by moderate reformers and conservative pragmatists. The emergence in recent months, in the run-up to the 2016 parliamentary elections, of new parties declaring support for the government's political course, focused on a moderately liberal foreign and domestic policy, confirms the possibility of the emergence of a third ideological trend. At the same time, it should be recognized that ranking political forces in terms of their ideological positions in the Iranian context is a rather difficult task. Most political parties, organizations, or fronts do not have clearly defined action programs. Their positions are often adjusted depending on the situation and tactical goals. Since, with the exception of a few well-known parties and organizations that are constantly engaged in political activity, most associations are active only during the pre-election period, it is possible to assess their positions only by monitoring the statements of leaders on certain issues and their reaction to events. Moreover, the leaders of political associations have radically conservative approaches to solving socio-cultural problems or foreign policy issues that can get along with liberal judgments in the field of economic activity.

New organizations with similar names and positions that are almost identical are constantly emerging on the political scene. The rivalry between these associations during election campaigns reflects not the struggle of ideas, but only the fragmentation of the political elite, its internal contradictions and ambitions, which are based on subjective likes and dislikes. Iran has not yet developed a party system in its modern sense. Although more than 200 political parties are registered, no more than a dozen operate on a permanent basis. They do not differ in mass character and reflect the interests of numerous elites, thereby only complicating the situation of voters - after all, the population does not evaluate the programs and slogans put forward by parties, but the persons who represent them. Most organizations rely on the authority, popularity, and capabilities of their leader.

Although the most pressing issues for both the authorities and society are the lifting of economic sanctions and the restoration of relations with the West, the approach of the parliamentary and Expert Council elections (March 2016) puts on the agenda the question of making some changes to the system governing the interaction of various elements of the political system. At the same time, various political forces offer their own vision of solving the urgent problems. Liberal politicians raise the question of the need to reform the mechanisms of control over the conduct of elections. The issues related to the withdrawal of the Supervisory Board's functions of approving candidates and the formation of an independent body responsible for conducting elections were updated. It is obvious, however, that the current composition of the Parliament is not ready to make significant changes to the budget.-

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The amendments to the election law and the Supervisory Board will remain a kind of filter that rejects undesirable candidates. Since this structure is dominated by representatives of the conservative direction, they can once again block the candidacies of the most active reformers. At the same time, on the proposal of the Mejlis, the Council for Determining the expediency develops a document "Fundamentals of electoral policy", the purpose of which is to prevent any abuses in the voting process and in the counting of votes, and to nominate candidates on party lists.

The issue of forming a new party system and changing the conditions of party activity is being actively discussed [www.shafaf.ir. 152049]. There is a public debate about the creation of a pro-government party and an active, influential legal opposition. Neda-ye ira-niyan, a neo-reformist party focused on students and urban youth, announced its appearance. A new liberal-conservative party "Rahravan-e Wali Faqiha"is being created under the leadership of Majlis Speaker A. Larijani. Ahmadinejad's entourage founded the Ikta party. All these organizations arise as secular organizations that operate without the support of religious structures.

There are more and more non-governmental organizations (NGOs), of which more than two thousand have already been registered, but they do not yet play a significant role in public and political life and are under state control [http://khodnevis.org/60957].

Despite the expectations of a certain part of the Iranian society, the Government of H. Rouhani has not started liberalizing political life: his campaign promises regarding the observance of civil rights, the rights of national minorities and women remain unfulfilled. The electorate that supports the president expresses dissatisfaction and puts pressure on the government, pushing it to take more active actions.

From the first days of X's reign. Certain political forces openly opposed Rouhani's intentions to pursue a more moderate, realistic domestic and foreign policy, accusing the authorities of deviating from the principles of the Islamic Revolution and making concessions to the West. Any attempts to correct the existing political traditions, involve new groups of the population in the decision-making process, and limit state control in the fields of science and education face tough opposition from radical Islamic groups.

Election of X. Rouhani changed the balance of power in the domestic political arena. The transfer of executive power to moderate reformers has angered political groups linked to the IRGC and the security services, which are reaping dividends from the sanctions. These groups, which have lost their executive power, continue to control a number of institutions of the political system. Representatives of radical conservative forces predominate in the Supervisory Board, the Council of Experts, the Council for Determining the Expediency of Decisions Taken, the Supreme National Security Council, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, the Council of Friday Imams, and occupy almost half of the seats in the Majlis. The radicals publish one of the country's central newspapers, Keyhan, and run numerous websites and other print media outlets, providing them with a platform to criticize the government and promote their views. Under the influence of conservatives are the leaders of the IRGC and the Basij movement, which they use during protest actions.

Supporters of X. Rouhani needs the support of the Majlis as the country's highest legislative body, where winning a majority of seats will allow him to implement reforms and retain power. In turn, conservatives see strengthening their positions in parliament as a step towards gaining executive power.

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Domestic political tensions are compounded by the fact that elections to the Council of Experts, the body that oversees Rahbar's activities and even has the power to remove him, will be held in parallel with the parliamentary elections. Due to the spiritual leader's advanced age, the issue of Khamenei's successors may appear on the agenda of the new composition of the Council of Experts. Some representatives of the higher clergy expressed the need to resolve this issue right now [khodnevis.org/article/65118#]. Shiite authorities are hatching the idea of replacing the spiritual leader with a council of faqihs. For example, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, in a recent interview with Sharg newspaper, said that in the absence of a candidate for the post of religious leader who meets all the requirements set out in the Constitution, his functions can be transferred to a council of three respected faqihs [www.khabaronline.ir/403799/Politics/parties?model=]. It is known that some ayatollahs allow limiting the powers of the Wali Faqih [http://rahetudeh.c0m/2015/april/502/sarmaghale.html], but the question of abolishing this structure is not raised within the country.

However, these ideas cause irritation in the conservative camp, which opposes the reform of the political system and fears losing influence over the spiritual leader. The head of the Supervisory Board, Ayatollah Janati, has repeatedly stated in recent months that there are forces that want to win a majority in the Council of Experts in order to destroy the velayate faqih as the main core of the political system [Ayatollah Janati...].

In the 2000s and 2010s, the role of the spiritual leader in society increased. Although some politicians admit the possibility of destroying this post, a significant part of Iranians perceive Khamenei as a wise and just leader who consistently defends national interests. The spiritual leader evaluates all events, delves into all problems and points out ways to solve them. In the context of the existence of various centers of power, it is the spiritual leader who is able to reach a consensus and make a final decision. The authority of the religious head determines the stability of the entire political system. Most likely, any attempts to introduce amendments to the Constitution in the near future aimed at narrowing the powers of the spiritual leader will not be understood by a significant part of the population and will run into opposition from the clergy and traditional institutions.

An analysis of the political development of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the period from the early 1990s to the present suggests that, despite the absence of significant changes in the structure of state administration and the preservation of the supremacy of spiritual power, there are tendencies to liberalize political life in the country. This is evidenced by the increased activity of political parties and public organizations, the expansion of political participation of citizens, and the gradual transformation of public sentiment in favor of democratization. The period of liberalization, which took a different form from Western stereotypes, turned out to be complex and ambiguous, characterized by the aggravation of contradictions in power structures.

The political system of Iran is developing in the direction of a gradual reduction of the Islamic component, although it periodically experiences rollbacks back to the political guidelines of the first post-revolutionary years. Traditional structures, which still hold strong positions, are doing their best to resist the reformers ' attempts to limit the power of the clergy and strengthen the republican institutions of government. Success of the X government. Rouhani will largely depend on the results of the parliamentary elections and on whether he can take control of the Council of Experts. If successful, moderate-liberal forces will be able to step up the movement towards political modernization. However, it should be understood that any actions in this direction "from above" will correspond to the concept of inseparability of religious and political imperatives. In the foreseeable future, Iran will develop within the framework of this dichotomy.

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