The Soviet Union's assistance to Ghana in achieving and consolidating its independence is a vivid and contradictory episode of the Cold War. It spans the period from Ghana's independence declaration in 1957 to the 1966 military coup. It is a story of hopes for socialist modernization, the clash of ideologies and pragmatism, and how well-intentioned actions, not grounded in local realities, can lead to catastrophic consequences.
The Soviet Union saw Ghana not just as a new trading partner but as a strategic platform for expanding its influence in Tropical Africa. In turn, Ghana sought the Soviet Union as a counterweight to Western influence and a source of resources for rapid economic growth.
On March 6, 1957, the British colony of the Gold Coast gained independence, becoming the first country in Tropical Africa to achieve sovereignty under the name Ghana. On January 4, 1957, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana sent an invitation to Premier Nikolai Bulganin of the Soviet Union to the ceremony of independence declaration, indicating his desire to establish contacts with the socialist bloc. At the festivities, negotiations took place between the head of the Soviet delegation I.A. Benediktov and Prime Minister Nkrumah. On December 30, 1957, a communique was signed establishing diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Ghana at the level of embassies.
The most intense period of cooperation occurred from 1960 to 1965. In August 1960, the first key intergovernmental agreements on trade, economic, and technical, as well as cultural cooperation, were signed.
The period from 1961 to 1966 became the "golden era" of Soviet-Ghanaian relations. The Soviet Union undertook to build a series of industrial facilities in Ghana: a fishery complex, a gold refining, machine-building, concrete, brick and tile factories, paper and cotton factories, as well as a hydroelectric power station on the Black Volta River. Soviet geologists conducted exploration of new gold, manganese ore, and limestone deposits. The Soviet Union helped in training national cadres and even participated in developing educational programs for the Institute of Ideology named after Kwame Nkrumah.
The key but ultimately unsuccessful project was the agreement to build a thermal nuclear research reactor with a power of 2 MW, signed in February 1961. By early 1966, its launch was being prepared, but the coup put an end to this project.
However, Soviet assistance also had a downside. Kwame Nkrumah, obsessed with the idea of accelerated industrialization and wishing to replicate the Soviet experience, adopted Moscow's recommended recipes, which proved detrimental to agrarian Ghana. These included the introduction of a planned economy, nationalization of large enterprises and banks, state control over industry, and the creation of collective farms in the countryside. These measures did not take into account Ghanaian realities and led to an economic collapse. Most joint projects turned into costly dossiers due to errors in planning and supply.
Nkrumah's domestic policy, encouraged by Soviet diplomats and experts, not only undermined the economy but also led to a decline in the standard of living of the population, ensuring the success of the February 24, 1966, military coup.
The Soviet Union's response to the coup was inconsistent. Initially, Moscow refused to recognize the new "reactionary, pro-Western regime" and even sent a ship with weapons to the shores of Western Africa for Nkrumah's supporters. However, the ship was recalled, and the Soviet Union restored full-fledged relations with the junta. This step was dictated by pragmatic interests: the need to return loans, maintain favorable trade, and complete the construction of already started projects. Thus, pragmatism pushed aside ideological imperatives, marking a new stage in Soviet policy in Africa.
Cooperation between the Soviet Union (and then Russia) and Ghana continued in subsequent decades. In the 1970s and 1980s, relations experienced periods of decline and renewal, and in the modern era, they are built on a pragmatic basis, including cooperation in the scientific-educational sphere and the development of political contacts.
© elib.pk
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